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Will Kymlicka’s theories of multiculturalism have gained wide interest in 
the West, but only recently have been applied beyond it. This research 
note assesses whether a Kymlickian approach provides traction for 
grasping the configuration of non-dominant ethnic groupings in Japan 
and how they have achieved a degree of multicultural recognition. It first 
identifies equivalents and exceptions within the Japanese case to 
Kymlicka’s key groupings: national minorities, indigenous peoples, 
immigrants, and metics. It then shows that of these, the last two drove the 
expansion of multicultural rights. Finally, it examines why they launched 
claims within a multicultural framework, and assess the limits of the 
multicultural claims for bolstering the rights of subordinate groups.   
 
   
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Over the past thirty years, multicultural theories, discourses, and claims have become 
well established in both academic analyses and public debates in the West. Yet they 
have not remained rooted in their areas of origin. It is perhaps unsurprising that 
multicultural configurations have been proclaimed in contexts like Russia, Turkey, 
and Brazil given the history of nation-formation in those countries.
1
  But since the 
turn of the millennium, a trend almost unimaginable a few decades before has taken 
hold in the analysis of Japanese society: academics have declared Japan multicultural. 
In the words of one prominent commentator, “Japan, like it or not, is becoming an 
increasingly plural society.”2  
 Such claims are bold. Even by the most expansive definitions of ethnic 
diversity, only 5% of the population in Japan is non-Japanese.
3
 Yet as the government 
in the decades following World War II repeatedly denied the existence of any non-
Japanese in the country, the bar was set low for asserting that Japan was more diverse 
than typically thought. Change since then has been slow, and politicians still issue 
xenophobic statements that would grab headlines in Europe, but go largely unnoticed 
in the local media. Nonetheless, in recent years the national government has come 
forward with a set of guidelines for prefectures and municipalities to promote 
multicultural coexistence.
4
 The result has been a greater recognition of and social 
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support for newcomers to the country.
5
 As such, though Japan is descriptively 
multicultural in limited form, some elements have become prescriptively 
multicultural.  How has this configuration emerged and what has been its impact? 
 
 
KYMLICKA‟S MULTICULTURALISM IN THE WEST AND BEYOND 
 
Multicultural claims turn on several issues, from intercultural dialogue and identity 
recognition, to rights of equality and self-government.
6
 Yet common across concerns, 
according to one of multiculturalism‟s the most vocal theorists, Will Kymlicka, is a 
basic grounding in liberal democratic values manifested in a commitment to race-
neutral admission and naturalization policies, and to multicultural modes of 
integration that allow people to freely express their ethnic identities and oblige public 
institutions to accommodate them.
7
  
 In an engagement on the prospects of multiculturalism in East Asia, Kymlicka 
argues that these values have flourished in the West – but not beyond – as a result of 
five factors. First is demography. Declining birthrates and increased immigration rates 
have shifted the population balance in the direction of non-dominant groups.  Second, 
the spread of liberal-democratic values since World War II has enabled members of 
minority groups to demand equality as a fundamental right.  Third, democratic forms 
of rule protect subordinate groups from indiscriminate repression and offer multiple 
arenas for claims-making. Fourth, post-war peace has reduced the threat that non-
dominant groups may collaborate with military enemies and removed minority 
politics from the domain of national security. Finally, a broad acceptance of 
democracy and human rights has reduced concerns that expanding minority rights will 
result in “islands of local tyranny” within a state.8 The broad array can be condensed 
into three factors: demographic shifts favoring minorities, the spread of democratic 
values and structures of rule, and post-war peace. According to Kymlicka, they 
account for two outcomes: the increased demand for multicultural rights by minority 
groups, and the diminished reluctance of ruling elites to grant them.  
 Looking beyond the West, Kymlicka maintains that the absence of these 
factors stands behind Asia‟s overall lackluster performance on multicultural issues. 
The logic of explanation is not only negative, however, and he suggests that 
multicultural claims have gained limited traction due also to a combination of 
unwelcoming elements. Members of dominant groups seem largely optimistic that 
sub-state ethnic divisions will diminish with modernization; that is, they take 
assimilation for granted. In cases where ethnic boundaries remain strong, the divisions 
are typically linked to ethnic violence, which render states reluctant to extend rights 
and privileges due to concerns for security. These two factors hold across multiple 
types of sub-national groups in Kymlicka‟s account. Additionally, he notes some 
group-specific factors that can be found in Asia as well. In the case of indigenous 
minorities, the ruling elite may see their claims as impeding much needed 
modernization and economic development. Long-term foreign residents that remain 
excluded from the polis – Koreans in Japan and “Indian Tamils” in Sri Lanka are his 
examples – may be regarded as having been wrongly privileged under colonial rule, 
with the result that now political rights are withheld to counterbalance their accrued 
economic power. Finally, elites may worry that granting greater regional autonomy 
will erode liberal democratic rule, which leads them to caution when extending rights 
to national minorities.
9
   
 
 Margins of Multiculturalism 3 
 
THE JAPANESE CASE 
 
In offering this set of explanations, Kymlicka captures the region in broad strokes, as 
he is well aware. But does his explanation stand up to the empirical evidence in 
specific national contexts? Japan is an interesting case to explore because, as 
Kymlicka himself notes, multicultural discourses have gained traction since the turn 
of the millennium. If the prime minister in 1986 was able to declare before the 
National Diet that Japan has no minorities, this was no longer tenable twenty years 
later.  Heralding the transformation was a rash of titles that proclaimed Japan to be far 
more ethnically diverse than received wisdom. Among them stood John Lie‟s 
Multiethnic Japan; Donald Denoon, Mark Hudson, Gavan McCormack and Tessa 
Morris-Suzuki‟s Multicultural Japan; Yoneo Ishii and Masayuki Yamauchi‟s 
Nihonjin to Tabunkashugi; Mike Douglass and Glenda Roberts‟s Japan and Global 
Migration: Foreign Workers and the Advent of a Multicultural Society; and Hiroshi 
Komai‟s Tabunka Shakai e no Michi.10 These analyses were not without precursors, 
including foundational studies on resident Koreans, and the myth of the homogeneous 
nation, as well as those spotlighting Japan‟s minorities. 11  But the turn of the 
millennium marked a discernable shift in how debates were framed as authors began 
reaching for the language of multiculturalism to capture the ethnic diversity that had 
long been sidelined. These did not go unnoticed as the media radiated the message 
outwards and non-governmental organizations pushed for greater awareness. By 
2005, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications issued the Plan for the 
Promotion of Multicultural Community Building intended to encourage “multicultural 
co-existence” in communities.  What drove this shift? 
 
 
NON-JAPANESE IN JAPAN 
 
To assess the extent to which Kymlicka‟s framework accounts for the variation within 
Japan, we can begin with the subordinated communities to which multicultural 
commitments apply, and which might press for multicultural rights.  For Kymlicka, 
these can be broken down into four groupings: (1) national minorities, or 
geographically concentrated cultural groups that conceive of themselves as a distinct 
nation within a larger state; (2) indigenous peoples, or aboriginal groups who have 
been stripped of land claims and cultural rights by colonizing settlers; (3) immigrant 
groups, or people who have chosen to emigrate and are placed on a short track to 
citizenship; and (4), metics, or foreigners regarded as only temporary inhabitants and 
not potential citizens. In Walzerian terms, they are the residents, such as asylum 
seekers, guestworkers, and foreign students, who are excluded from the polis.
12
  
 Applied to Japan, Kymlicka‟s categories find several possible analogues. As 
will be addressed in greater detail below, the Ainu approximate indigenous people, 
the Okinawans can be seen as a national minority, and the large and diverse 
population of foreigners, dominated by Chinese, Koreans, and Brazilians, constitute a 
class of metics and immigrants – albeit a heterogeneous one, whose members possess 
vastly different legal rights. Kymlicka‟s rubric reaches its limits, though, in the case 
of the two to three million Burakumin, members of a former outcaste class who were 
stigmatized and racialized for undertaking “unclean” jobs in the past, including 
leatherwork and animal slaughter. They are more geographically dispersed than 
national minorities and lack the background of settler invasion distinctive to 
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indigenous groups. In their case, the logic of exclusion has been formulated in 
roughly caste terms, and the material basis for claims of a distinct culture, central to 
Kymlicka‟s argument, is thin. Indeed, in recent years, the anti-discrimination efforts 
by their leading organization, the Buraku Liberation League, have stressed the basic 
sameness of Burakumin and mainstream Japanese over any deep difference – 
sometimes to the chagrin of other subordinated groups.
13
  
 On this terrain, does the presence and absence of the factors Kymlicka 
identifies as propelling the expansion of multicultural rights in the West account for 
the emergence of limited multicultural claims in Japan? To begin with indigenous 
peoples, the Ainu lend credence to Kymlicka‟s argument that demographics matter, 
but in a negative manner. In the late nineteenth century, the Japanese state laid 
sovereign claim to the large northern island, now known as Hokkaido, populated by a 
hunter-gatherer population that moved into trading as the Japanese encroached. 
Colonization and settlement displaced the indigenous Ainu whose numbers 
deteriorated from a peak of 80,000 through illness, intermarriage, and assimilation. 
When Tokyo granted them national membership with limited rights in 1899, they lost 
the possibility to legally claim aboriginal status.
14
 This held until the government 
passed a non-binding resolution in 2008 that formally recognized their indigeneity. 
Over the past few decades, the rise of a “new Ainu politics,” 15  fusing identity 
consciousness and political action, has secured some gains in cultural recognition and 
native land rights. But with only a mere 25,000 Ainu remaining, according to official 
accounts,
16
 their small numbers limit the possibility of large-scale social and political 
transformation based on their causes.    
 Demographics, however, do not explain why the Okinawans, numbering 
slightly over one million, have not produced a vigorous multicultural movement for 
national autonomy. Before its annexation by Japan in 1879, the chain of islands now 
constituting Okinawa Prefecture stood as a separate Ryūkyū kingdom. Culturally 
distinct from its two more powerful neighbors, Qing China and Tokugawa Japan, the 
kingdom negotiated, over the centuries, varying degrees of political autonomy from 
both.
17
 Self-rule came to an end when Japanese imperial annexation transformed 
Ryūkyū into Okinawa, and into not only the most distant but also the most destitute 
prefecture in what would become “naichi,” or the inner lands of the empire.  With 
Japanese defeat in 1945, this once self-standing political entity might have made a 
move for independence, but mobilization for greater autonomy was immediately 
stymied by the American occupation. The US government took sovereign control 
over the Okinawa and converted it into a military outpost, and the Okinawans 
became, effectively, a stateless people.
18
 For them, aligning with Tokyo provided the 
most effective means to combat the hardships of American rule and the conversion of 
much prime land into US bases. Across the post-war period, the government in Tokyo 
continued to press for political control over Okinawa to revert back to Japan, which it 
gained in 1972, rendering the Okinawans Japanese rather than autonomous Ryūkyū-
ians.
19
 With American military bases still occupying nearly twenty percent of the 
main island, protest continues daily, but it has brought little momentum towards 
independence. As such, not the dynamics of liberal democracy, but of imperial 
politics account for the limits to their claims. 
 Thus neither the indigenous populations nor the national minorities have been 
the key targets or the torchbearers of multiculturalism in Japan. The case is different, 
however, for Kymlicka‟s other two groupings – immigrants and metics – though his 
categories must be applied with some care. Strictly speaking, no one is admitted into 
the Japan as an immigrant; the country‟s border control regime recognizes only 
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temporary entrance. Furthermore, the long-standing foreign populations, including the 
400,000 “zainichi” Koreans resident in the country for over three generations, have 
obtained expansive rights, approaching those of citizens.
20
 As such, the label “metic” 
is somewhat misplaced in their case. Yet Kymlicka‟s division captures a key 
distinction within the diverse group of foreigners in Japan, between the Korean 
population, present for over 70 years, and the “newcomers” who have arrived over the 
past two decades, largely from China, Brazil, and the Philippines.   
 The resident Korean population is the product of Japanese imperial expansion 
and defeat. When Japan annexed the Korean peninsula in 1910, its population became 
Japanese nationals of a lesser sort – members of the “gaichi” outer lands, rather than 
the “naichi” metropole. Wartime labor conscription, however, forced masses of 
Koreans across the Sea of Japan, their numbers reaching two million by 1945.  At the 
end of World War II, most but not all returned to their homeland, leaving around 
600,000 in the defeated Japan.
21
 Stripped of their Japanese nationality in 1952, they 
were rendered stateless by the Korean War. While North Korea, consolidating 
influence throughout the 1950s and 60s, actively sought to repatriate as many as 
possible to increase its population, South Korea moved to secure permanent residence 
overseas for those who pledged allegiance to the ROK. The 1965 Treaty on Basic 
Relations that normalized affairs between Japan and the southern half of the peninsula 
established this as a right.  Within a few years, and following a strong campaign 
waged by Seoul, roughly half of the Koreans in Japan elected to register as South 
Korean nationals, generally for pragmatic rather than political reasons.
22
  In the late 
1980s, Japan extended special residence rights to all long-standing resident Koreans, 
even those who did not register with the South Korean government. Furthermore legal 
reforms granted them privileges nearly equivalent with those of Japanese nationals, 
with the exception of the franchise at the national level and the right to hold some 
public offices. 
 Yet even as some rights were extended, Koreans remained socially excluded 
from Japanese society and were rarely tempted to assume the nationality of their 
former colonial oppressors. In the 1950s and 60s, they developed a well-networked 
community supported by schools, businesses, temples, and civic organizations.
23
 Aid 
from both Korean governments fostered the growth of “North” and “South” variants 
of these institutions, and competition between the camps enhanced the allegiances and 
identities at stake.
24
 Civic organizations, on the whole, did not fight for easy access to 
Japanese citizenship, for in Japan the equation of citizenship with identity – 
condensed to the formula that all Japanese are citizens of Japan and all citizens of 
Japan are Japanese – was seen to undermine their membership base.25 Nonetheless, 
demographic change has taken its toll on the community, whose strength has been 
eroded by high rates of exogamy combined with pressures of linguistic and cultural 
assimilation. Mixed marriages account over 80% of unions, and over 90% attend 
Japanese schools.
26
 Though continued stigmatization of Koreanness has ensured that 
they remain a subordinated population, it is not solely the “myth of the homogeneous 
nation” that preserves the ethnic boundary.27 Cold War politics and the interests of 
community organizations that have made significant contributions to the maintenance 
of an institutionally complete Korean community, if one divided along north-south 
lines. As such, the case offers little support for Kymlicka‟s argument that peace 
among neighboring countries promotes the extension of multicultural rights. In Japan, 
relations with South Korea have been normalized, while military tensions still run 
high with North Korea. Nonetheless, rights in recent years have been extended to 
long-standing resident Koreans across the board.   
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EMERGENCE OF MULTICULTURAL CLAIMS 
 
Yet these rights were neither claimed nor achieved though references to 
multiculturalism. The proximate cause behind its rise came from elsewhere: the 
arrival of a new wave of foreigners. Entering after immigration law reform from 1990 
opened several front and side doors, these new arrivals doubled the foreign population 
over the course of 25 years to just over 2 million.
28
 Though the Chinese are the most 
numerous today, numbering over 700,000, the Japanese-Brazilians and Japanese-
Peruvians are the key group of interest due to the special visa rights they enjoy that 
facilitate long-term settlement. 
  The Immigration Control Act, which took effect in 1990, granted the 
descendants of Japanese emigrants through the third-generation indefinitely 
renewable residence permits with no work restrictions for visits to Japan. Though 
these were, ostensibly, to enable them to learn about their cultural heritage and visit 
their ancestors‟ graves, businesses embraced this new supply of low-skilled workers 
for undesirable jobs.
29
 By the mid-2000s, their numbers hovered around 300,000. 
Able to bring their families, these initially temporary migrants often ended up settling 
in Japan as their children became an anchor in the new community. It was the 
children, as they entered local schools, that provided the supportive frame for the 
discourse of multiculturalism, labeled tabunka kyōsei, or “multicultural co-existence,” 
to take hold in Japan.     
 The term kyōsei – co-existence – was already in use at the time. In academic 
circles, the neologism moved from biology to pedagogy in the 1970s when it was first 
used in the effort to develop classrooms where handicapped children could learn 
alongside their peers. By the late 1980s, it was extended to learning environments 
where different genders could “co-exist.” Thus it was a term educators and civic 
organizations could reach for in the 1990s when they began to grapple with the 
challenges posed by a new wave of migrants settling in their locales.
30
 At the time, the 
multicultural boom was in full swing in North America and Europe, which became 
sources of inspiration, and by the close of the decade, many educators and non-
government organization activists with international connections began to speak of a 
multicultural Japan. These two groups, educators and civic organizations, encouraged 
the spread of tabunka kyōsei as a discourse loosely organized around the imperative 
for different cultures to live together in harmony. Though initially its usage was 
confined to newly arrived foreigners, the term found ready application to the resident 
Koreans as well. Within a few years, the governments of cities with growing foreign 
populations – not only Brazilians, but Chinese, Filipinos, and others – began to latch 
on, using “multicultural coexistence” to frame their integration efforts. By the mid-
2000s, even the national government issued a plan for the “promotion of multicultural 
co-existence” in local communities, encouraging all major cities and prefectures to 
develop the means for “multicultural community building.”31   
 Yet a sea change did not follow. In the decade since the unfunded plan was 
first issued, the national government has done little else to promote a multicultural 
Japan.  Advances remain limited to the local efforts of a few dozen cities and schools 
with substantial foreign populations. The programs implemented, which largely 
concern tolerance promotion and multilingualism, typically provide helpful services 
to foreign residents and their families, but do little to challenge public perceptions.
32
  
Critics assert both that they do not go far enough and that they encourage a static 
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vision of separate and homogeneous cultures.
33
 As analysts of multicultural endeavors 
have shown, poorly designed programs can reinforce the stereotypes and structures of 
oppression they are meant to dismantle.
34
 
 If implementation raises difficulties, so too do definitions and inclusivity.  
Multicultural coexistence programs, as they reach out to some, do not reach out to 
others. In Japan, these schemes have largely addressed issues concerning foreigners 
rather than ethnic minorities in general; Ainu, Okinawans, and Burakumin have only 
recently begun to appear in these discourses. Furthermore, within the broader 
category of foreigners, only a subsection is targeted: those with anchors in local 
communities, such as third-generation resident Koreans, Japanese-Brazilians raising 
children in Japan, or Chinese and Southeast Asians who have married Japanese and 
made a home on the archipelago. The limit is understandable given the municipal 
base that provides traction for the programs that are funded and implemented by 
cities. The result, however, is that some of the foreigners in the most difficult 
circumstances within Japan remain outside their remit. Most notable are the nearly 
200,000 trainees and technical interns recruited under the guise of skills transfer who 
work long hours under sub-standard conditions for less than minimum wages. Over 
65 percent are from China, though Vietnam, the Philippines, and Indonesia also send 
workers, and they labor in textiles, food processing, agriculture, and metalwork for a 
maximum of three years. The government, which likens the low-paid temporary work 
program to a “study abroad” scheme, stipulates no absolute limit on the number 
accepted, but creates a ceiling by constraining the proportion of trainees to no more 
than five percent of employees in a company.
35
 To their count can be added 
undocumented foreigners and visa overstayers, whom the government estimates to 
hover around 60,000, but which are likely to number much higher.
36
 Neither set is 
easily reached by multicultural policies, though they are some of the most vulnerable 
non-Japanese in the country.  The trainee program has come under repeated criticism 
by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and the U.S. Department of 
State has declared that it amounts to “slavery” or “forced labor” in some cases.37 The 
brokers who traffick temporary workers into the country routinely confiscate 
passports at the border and charge usurious management fees, while employers 
extract hundreds of dollars for sub-standard room, board, and clothing costs.
38
 As a 
result, many trainees and technical interns have little option but to put in long 
overtime hours or work through holidays. Unsurprisingly, death by overwork is above 
the national average.
39
 For them, the most pressing problems do not turn on the issues 
that dominate the multicultural debate – identity and cultural rights – but rather on 
work conditions and legal status. Furthermore, as the multicultural ambit extends only 
as far as community membership, the “co-existence” rhetoric fits poorly with those 
whose residence is temporary or illicit.  Debates about whether or not Japan should 
adopt a multicultural identity or whether multicultural co-existence promotes 
assimilation or pillorization reach their limit when it comes to addressing the most 
difficult issues facing a substantial portion of the non-Japanese population.  
 
 
ASSESSMENT 
 
What are the implications for the application of Kymlicka‟s theory of 
multiculturalism outside the West, and in Japan in particular?  His framework usefully 
proposes where to look for multicultural movements, whether around indigenous, 
national minority, or foreigners‟ rights. Yet two of the key factors he identifies as 
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driving the expansion of multicultural rights in the West – peaceful relations with 
neighbors and democratic values and forms of rule – offer less explanatory leverage 
than the power politics he ignores. Multicultural debates might have developed 
around indigenous or national minority rights, but demography in the case of the Ainu 
and American foreign interests in the case of the Okinawans – the latter factor wholly 
overlooked by Kymlicka – neutralized this possibility. Instead, they emerged around 
foreigners. These discourses coalesced in the late 1990s as localities with 
concentrations of newcomers modified western models of multiculturalism in their 
search for frameworks to deal with the issues raised by foreign populations staying 
longer than expected. The multicultural co-existence call for mutual respect and 
tolerance subsequently found reception among the longer-standing foreign 
community of resident Koreans. Demography does play a role – the number of 
foreigners in Japan doubled as overall population growth slowed – but numbers alone 
do not account for the emergence of “multicultural co-existence” as a framing device 
that spread through pedagogical and international channels.   
 Still, the extent to which multicultural imperatives are recognized remains 
limited. The government has done little more than offer white papers, and has left a 
patchwork of municipalities to develop programs on their own. The factors Kymlicka 
proposes that might limit the traction of multiculturalism have uneven application. Of 
them, assumptions among the ruling elite that non-Japanese will eventually assimilate 
remain strong. The government has periodically cited security concerns when 
cracking down on resident Koreans, particularly those affiliated with North Korean 
organizations, but it has rarely, if at all, employed them against the Ainu, Okinawans, 
or Brazilian-Japanese. Offering less leverage are the group-specific explanations that 
Kymlicka lays out: concerns that self-rule for national minorities will diminish liberal 
democracy; worries that rights for indigenous groups will inhibit economic 
modernization; and beliefs that metics, privileged under colonial rule and wielding 
economic leverage, should not be unduly favored. None of these hold for the Japanese 
case. With the third largest economy in the world, economic development and 
modernization has not been a concern for nearly half a century. The foreigners who 
came to the country under Japanese colonial rule were more oppressed than 
privileged. Finally, the erosion of liberal democratic rule in places like Okinawa, 
where breakaway nationalism is conceivable, has never been a concern.  Indeed, when 
it is thematized in Okinawan protests, it is usually to assert the opposite: that greater 
regional autonomy is needed to preserve democracy and respect for electoral 
outcomes against Tokyo‟s attempts to impose its own military decisions.   
 If multicultural claims have resulted in gains for some, their extension to 
others remains limited. Their effectiveness has been restricted to populations with ties 
of residence to a community. More transient populations of foreigners, such as 
temporary migrant workers, remain outside their ambit.  Indeed, the case of Singapore 
illustrates that the adoption of a multicultural national self-definition itself does little 
to address the exploitation of temporary and irregular workers.
40
 As a contribution to 
normative political theory, Kymlicka‟s framework is still wanting when it comes to 
addressing the needs of many ethnic minorities within Japan. Multicultural claims and 
demands typically carry a bias towards settlement, which can leave many of the 
worst-off foreigners still at the margins.   
 
 
 
NOTES 
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